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In the fast developing digital technological revolution even the newly industrialized 
economies (the NIEs) have found it hard to catch up and maintain the pace required for 
not falling behind. The developing economies are clearly at a great disadvantage in such 
a fast paced technological race. Thus there is a digital divide that is growing and through 
a cumulative causation the gap will widen further unless coordinated action is taken. This 
paper discusses some of the most important economic issues conceptually and offers 
some modest policy advice. The basic problem of adoption of a new technology system 
such as the ICT( information and communications technologies) is explored via the 
theory of a positive feedback loop innovation system (POLIS) in a nonlinear, path-
dependent world where institutional structure and its evolution matter crucially. By 
investing strategically in physical, intellectual and other forms of human and 
organizational capital as well as building new institutions of cooperation the NIEs may be 
able to forge a path not only in the ICT sectors, but also create innovation systems of 
their own that can be extended to region-wide systems. Under the emerging globally 
competitive market environment this will be the best way to compete dynamically. 
However, creating comparative advantage in this way requires capabilities that many 
NIES in Asia will need to promote. Creative policy interventions with a mix of market 
promotion, good governance, relative openness, and promotion of sustainable 
development in an equitable manner are necessary if the  NIEs are not to be left far 
behind. The theoretical approach developed here also allows to evaluate the state of the 
economy and society ethically by extending and incorporating Amartya Sen’s capabilities 
approach within the POLIS.   3 
1. Introduction: 
 
The digital age has been heralded with great fanfare. However, if hyberboles are set 
aside and a sober assessment is made, we find the beginnings of a technological 
revolution that has already created much uncertainty. So far the benefits have also 
been largely confined to the developed countries. Even the newly industrialized 
economies (the NIEs) have found it hard to catch up and maintain the pace required 
for not falling behind. The developing economies are clearly at a great disadvantage 
in such a fast paced technological race. Thus there is a digital divide that is growing 
and through a cumulative causation the gap will widen further unless coordinated 
action is taken. This paper will discuss some of the most important economic issues 
conceptually and offer some modest policy advice. The idea of a postmodern 
innovation system called POLIS--- POSITIVE FEEDBACK LOOP INNOVATION 




Specifically, in the next section, the basic problem of adoption of a new technology 
system such as the ICT( information and communications technologies) is explored 
via the Schumpeterian concept of creative destruction. Section 3 sketches out the 
links between the ICT sectors, innovation, growth and development. Section 4 briefly 
outlines some special economic features related to the ICTs. Most important among 
these are the increasing returns to scale, network externalities and a disequilibrium 
process that can result in multiple possible equilibria at the end. Section 5 is the most 
substantive part of the paper. Here innovation as a positive feedback loop process is 
studied further, and a case study of such process is presented. The South Korean case 
study is a detailed investigation at both micro and macro levels of the requirements of 
an innovation system that can include ICTs as an integral part. The study leads 
towards a recognition of the limits of purely national efforts and suggests that a 
supranational institutional structure based on the principle of regional cooperation 





2. ICTs and Creative Destruction: 
 
Writing in another era, Joseph Schumpeter seems to have been quite prescient in 
terms of describing the essence of what is happening globally today. In his book 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, he averred: 
 
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in 
motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of 
production or transportation, the new markets,....  (This process) 
incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly   4 
destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of 
Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.
1 
 
The ICT revolution in progress today is indeed a Schumpeterian process of creative 
destruction. The essence of capitalism in this view, is the constant revolutionizing of the 
economic structure from within. Marx had made a similar observation about the 
endogenous nature of technical change (Marx, 1867, 1945). Aghion and Howitt (1992) 
have proposed a model of creative destruction by treating  the innovation process as 
intense inter-firm rivalry, as in the patent-race literature. 
  
    The present approach assumes, following Schumpeter, and Aghion and 
Howitt, that innovation in specific firms can have economy-wide effects. The expected  
growth rate of the economy depends on the economy-wide amount of research; but the 
process of this growth, precisely because research leads to the development of new 
products and processes, is characterized by creative destruction.  
 
    The relationship between R&D and growth is therefore both intimate and 
complex. An economy-wide model intending to capture this complex relationship will 
need to posit non-linearities and complex feedback rules. In the main body of this paper, 
no formal attempt is made to achieve this by  endowing production functions and 
correspondences with some of these nonlinear and complex feedback features. However, 
it can be done--- in particular, by defining non-linear production structures so that 
increasing returns and  endogenous innovations are possible, one can explore the 
properties of fixed points that define equilibria at any point in time. A sequence of such 
equilibria over time, picked  by an appropriate selection procedure, can then show the 
evolution of the system.
2  In the appendix,  a prototype model is presented with two 
different existence proofs, first on a vector lattice, and then on the Banach space. 
The problem of the developing countries in this ICT revolution is precisely that they face 
the destructive side of this process without being able to benefit necessarily from the 
creative side. The prospects for benefits exist but to realize them will require cooperation 
from the developed countries and domestic policy maneuvers. But what are these ICT 
sectors precisely?  
 
3. ICT, Innovation, Growth and Development: 
 Before discussing the relation between ICT sectors and economic  
growth, innovation and development, it is first necessary to have a clear definition of the  
ICT sectors. The most widely accepted definition so far is the one agreed to at the April 
1998 meeting of the Working Party on Indicators for the Information Society (WPIIS) 
and subsequently endorsed at the September 1978 meeting of the Committee for 
Information, Computer and Communication Policy of OECD. The following principles 
underlie the definition. 
 
 
                                                 
1   Schumpeter (1942) p. 83 
2             For an extended formal treatment , see Khan (1998) and Khan(2001a). Existence proofs for 
multiple equilibria are also given in these sources.    5 
For manufacturing industries, the products of a candidate industry: 
•  Must be intended to fulfill the function of information processing and 
communication including transmission and display. 
•  Must use electronic processing to detect, measure and/or record physical 
phenomena or to control a physical process. 
 
For services industries, the products of a candidate industry: 
•  Must be intended to enable the function of information processing and 
communication by electronic means. 
 
Based on these principles the ICT sectors are identified within the revised classes of 
the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). In manufacturing and 
services the following four digit sectors are included: 
 
Manufacturing 
•  3000-Office, accounting and computing machinery 
•  3130-Insulated wire and cable 
•  3210-Electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components 
•  3220-television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line 
telegraphy 
•  3230-Television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing 
apparatus, and associated goods 
•  3312-Instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating and 
other purposes, except industrial process equipment 
•  3313-Industrial process control equipment 
Services 
•  5150-Wholesaling of machinery, equipment and supplies 
•  7123-Renting of office machinery and equipment (including computers) 
•  6420-telecommunications 
•  7200-Computer and related activities 
 
In short, roughly there are three broad categories of the new ICTs: (1) computing  (2) 
communicating  (3) Internet-enabled communication and computing. 
Strictly speaking, not all of ICT sectors are digital, or at least not yet. Even within the 
digital part, the pre- and post- internet distinction is historically important and 
relevant for the developing economies, as Tschang(2000) points out. 
We can roughly dissect the digital economy’s infrastructure into its pre-Internet and 
Internet eras. Before the Internet, a host of information technologies came into existence, 
which provided computing power on a platform-specific system, usually centralized (e.g. 
a central mainframe with terminals) or distributed within a local area. The advent of the 
Internet (and its precursors, the U.S. government-funded research networks like the 
defense research network - ARPANET) was a critical event because it set up the basic 
infrastructure, standards (e.g. protocols for communication) and technologies, that 
enabled large scale, distributed and platform-independent information exchange and 
manipulation. This “single” system allowed the introduction of literally unlimited sources 
of information, or access points to it, in a scaleable fashion, i.e., without increasing   6 
numbers of constraints or decreasing economic “returns to scale”. The first computing 
functions consisted of basic email and file transfer capabilities like ftp and gopher, but 
these were soon coupled with basic “Web” technologies, like the development of the first 
browsers and the standards and technologies of the “World Wide Web”. This latter 
further improved the remote accessing and manipulation of information, and ensured that 
all information could be “web-based”, and therefore potentially viewable/downloadable 
by anyone connected to the Web. All these set the stage for electronic commerce to take 
place, since the connection of such large numbers of people to all the sources of 
information provided a potential market never possible in the history of markets.  
 
Today, the developing countries may be able to leapfrog, as Soete (1985) had earlier 
conjectured for microelectronics; but there is a real danger of just lagging behind.The 
situation can be summarized by simply looking at the state of e-commerce infrastructure.  
OECD (1999) offers a classification of the infrastructure sectors for e-commerce: (1) 
hardware (PCs, routers, servers etc.), (2) software to run the hardware and e-commerce 
packages, (3) network service providers (e.g. providing Internet access), and (4) enabling 
services (e.g. e-payment, authentication/certification services, advertising and delivery). 
The revenue for these four categories have been estimated as follows: 
 
Table 1. Value of E-commerce (billions of U.S. dollars) 
 
 
 1995-97  2000-02 
Hardware 11-30  43-72 
Software and computer services  0.9  3.8-5.1 
Network service providers  0.3-6.3  5-46.4 
Enabling services  0.5-1  7.6-10 
E-commerce 
Total e-commerce  (median of multiple studies)  0.7  155 
Business-to-business e-commerce (average over 
various years: 1996-2002) 
78  
 
Source:  (Tschang (2000), OECD (1999)) 
 
The state of the developing economies is underlined by the fact that this table does not 
even include them as a category via a breakdown into developed and developing 
economies. One reason why this idea  may not even have crossed the minds of the OECD 
volume authors is that even if the suggested breakdown were to be carried out, the 
percentage share within each category (in table 1 above)  for the developing economies  
would have been less than  one per cent. Along the key dimensions of a digital economy 
such as computers per capita, internet providers, telecommunications infrastructure and 
cellular telephony etc. also the developing countries are far behind the developed ones. 
Even advanced developing countries, i.e., NIEs and other large economies such as the 
Asian tigers, China, India, Brazil or Mexico are in danger of falling further behind. What 
can explain this tendency and how best can the developing countries catch up? A   7 
conceptual clarification of the basic economics involved will help guide policy 
discussions in this area. It is to this task that the rest of the paper is devoted.   8 
 
 
4. The Basic Economics of ICT and Knowledge Sectors: 
 
The key to understanding the economics of ICT and knowledge sectors is to realize that a 
disequilibrium process has set in within the world economy and the advanced countries 
of the world that is leading to rapid economic changes. These changes include 
intersectoral shifts toward the ICT and knowledge sectors, changing skill requirements, 
high volatility of wages, profits and financial variables and consequent increase in 
uncertainty about the future states of the economy. The dynamics of this disequilibrium 
process must be studied through methods of  understanding complexity.Clearly, our 
knowledge of such dynamic systems is still in its infancy; but much can be learned by 
studying some known features. 
 
In the last twenty years, the frontiers of economics have moved far beyond the standard 
models of decreasing or constant returns where costs can not be decreased beyond a 
certain point, unless factor markets behave in a peculiarly decreasing marginal cost 
fashion. Leaving the perfectly competitive world behind, economists at the frontiers have 
been focusing on increasing returns to scale, economies of scope and network 
externalities.
3 The world of high technology in general and the ICT and knowledge 
sectors in particular, are characterized much better through these approaches than the old 
perfectly competitive models. Many models of imperfect competition have also been 
developed to study interesting and relevant phenomena such as R&D rivalry and R&D 
expenditures. The upshot of these developments is that economists at the frontiers of their 
discipline are much closer to understanding many aspects of the digital economy than 
they were ten years ago. In this paper I want to illustrate this point by discussing a 
recently developed theoretical and modeling approach. The policy implications for the 
ICT and knowledge sectors of developing countries are quite striking. 
5. Positive Feedback Loops, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights in 
Developing Countries: 
 
The concept of NIS or National Innovation System, like many other concepts in the field 
of economics of innovation was originally proposed for analyzing developed 
technological systems in the advanced industrial countries (Freeman:1987;Nelson: 
1993;Anderson and  Lundvall: 1992;). As a systems-oriented, holistic way of thinking 
about technological change it has undoubted strengths. By drawing the link between 
R&D, human resources development, formal education and training as well as innovating 
firms, 
 NIS presents an analytical schema for relating  a cross cutting array of activities that lead 
to a dynamic innovative economy. The proponents of this approach also advocate an 
`evolutionary’ as opposed to a mechanistic approach based on classical physics type 
study of equilibria for studying the economics of innovation. 
  Given the obviously sincere and serious intentions of the theorists of NIS and the 
intellectual break with neoclassical economics, the study of NIS held out promises of 
                                                 
3 Among the sources cited in the references see in particular, Arthur(1994), Matsuyama (1991), 
Khan(1998) among others.   9 
both retrospective understanding of economic history and a prospective, prescriptive 
approach to help countries innovate. Nowhere was this promise more eagerly believed 
than in the developing countries. No one was more excited by the prospects of NIS than 
the avid modernizers in the governments, universities and international organizations and 
think tanks. I have documented in great detail elsewhere (Khan, 1997; 1998; 
forthcoming) the reach and sweep of NIS in newly industrializing countries such as South 
Korea and Taiwan. 
  Yet, so far the thinking about NIS, and its connections to modernity and 
development have been entirely technocratic. The argument always proceeds in terms of 
the function of technologies and their role in increasing GDP/capita in the most efficient 
manner. The intense and inconclusive debate raging with respect to whether East Asia 
has really grown because of a simple accumulation of labor and capital or because of 
productivity increase through genuine technical progress and learning illustrates neatly 
this technocratic bias. Neither side is willing to step beyond the economic inputs and 
outputs, production functions and technology as a black box. It is, of course, important to 
know whether learning has taken place in, for instance, textiles or electronics sectors. But 
there is no recognition of the point made by Feenberg and others, namely that “…design 
responds not only to the social meaning of individual technical objects, but also 
incorporates broader dimensions about social values” (Feenberg 1999, p. 86). 
  This “cultural horizon” of NIS which legitimately can be said to constitute a 
hermeneutic, interpretive dimension, should offer some interpretative flexibility. A recent 
paper by Murata (1999) illustrates the relevance and importance of such interpretative 
flexibility by simple but elegant examples such as the go-slow street barriers(to restrict 
speed) and harnessing the driver of a car to the key to prevent her from leaving it in the 
car in a fit of forgetfulness.When an underdeveloped economy accepts an NIS whose 
components come from abroad, a society-wide hermeneutic process is unleashed. Yet this 
is where the interpretative flexibility is frequently blocked by the closure imposed 
undemocratically over the rest of the population by the technocratic elite and their 
modernizing allies from the outside. 
  Such premature closures can certainly produce success stories. In Taiwan, for 
example, NIS has succeeded to the extent that it has been able to capture market shares in 
various high technology areas.The swift capture by the Taiwanese manufacturers the 
lion’s shares of world information technogy hardware markets is nothing short of 
amazing. In most relevant product categories Taiwan has more than 50 percent of market 
share. In some categories such as scanners it has almost cornered the whole market. Yet 
further progress requires both a deeper understanding of the diseqilibrium processes at 
work leading towards multiple equilibria, and the social-cultural implications of the 
complex economics of the production and   distribution aspects of NIS. It is with a 
view towards capturing these complexities leading towards multiple equilibria that an 
alternative conceptualization of technology systems transition has been formulated by 
some economists (Khan 1993; James and Khan 1997; Khan 1998, 2001a,b) . In addition 
to capturing both equilibrium and disequilibrium features of technological transitions, 
this broad approach can illuminate distributional issues as well. Since poverty alleviation 
remains on the agenda of the national governments of developing countries and the 
international development agencies, it can be argued that from this perspective at least the 
new approach has obvious relevance for the developing countries.   10 
 
Khan(1998, 2001a; 2002) has formalized this approach and has coined the abbreviation 
POLIS to emphasize both the disequilibrium positive feedback loop features and the 
politico-social dimensions of the technological transitions. For the current ICT transitions 
in developing countries this model has been applied to South Korea, Taiwan, China and 
India, with work underway for Indonesia. The key results for policy purposes will be 
described shortly; but first let us take a closer look at the concept itself. For existence 
proofs of two different but related ways of modeling POLIS, the reader is referred to the 
appendix to this paper.   11 
 
 




    It has been known for some time that technological systems are complex 
structures with many types of feedback loops and nonlinear relations. In this context, 
strategies of technological development assume new importance. As the debate on the 
“East Asian miracle” underlines, the key strategic question for a country that has made a 
technological transition from a traditional to a modern system concerns the prospects for 
long-term economic growth.  Ultimately, it is the sustainable long-term rate of growth 
that will determine the wealth that can be distributed among personal consumption, 
investment, government spending on infrastructure and public services, etc. 
 
    Therefore, it is the creation of an innovation system that will determine the 
viability of a technology-based growth process.  This process of building an innovation 
system is very much an evolutionary and path-dependent process.(Nelson 1981, 1989, 
1993, 1994; Nelson and Winter 1974, 1977, 1982) The central idea is that the provision 
of appropriate types of capital, labor and forms of organization for high value-added 
industries will lead to rapid productivity increases.  However, to sustain such an increase, 
a domestic innovation system must be set up. There is a further requirement that this 
innovation system must fulfill. This is the requirement of a positive feedback loop or a 
virtuous cycle of innovations. 
 
    This problem, as I have emphasized, is intimately connected with the 
existence of multiple equilibria in complex economies.  A positive feedback loop leading to 
a virtuous cycle of growth and technology development is one particular sequence of 
equilibria in this context.
4 In general, such a sequence also involves increasing returns. In 
the remainder of this section a theoretical exploration of innovation with increasing returns 
and multiple equilibria will be undertaken. 
 
    In a market economy, ‘success’ is often cumulative or self-reinforcing.   
Typically outcomes are not predictable in advance.  However, once an equilibrium gets 
selected out of a number of long-run equilibria, there is a tendency to be locked in.   
Technically, economic processes exhibit non-convexities -- violating the generic assumption 
of competitive equilibrium economics. The presence of self-reinforcing mechanisms sharing 
common features found in fields as far apart as enzyme reactions and the economics of 
technical change underlines the importance of such mechanisms in governing the dynamics 




                                                 
4 If there is more than one such sequence, we may be tempted to choose from among them, the “optimal” 
sequence, according to some well-defined criterion, e.g., present value maximization. 
5  See the essays in Arthur(1994) for some illuminating discussions.   12 
    In order to give the reader some idea of the problem of formalizing 
complex technological systems, I summarize here in the basic structure of a ‘simple’ non-
linear model embodying distinct technological systems and give existence proofs. At any 
single point in time, the model can be presented as a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
representation of the socio-economic system.  The key distinction here is the explicitly 
non-linear nature of the economy-wide functional relationships. The key theorem shows 
the existence of multiple equilibria. Some further considerations  lead to the specification 
of definite technology sectors such as the ICT sectors, productivity enhancement and 
income distribution. Thus a closed loop feedback sytem including all the production and 
distribution mechanisms can be set to work. The attractiveness of such an approach to the 
proponents of a holistic perspective should be readily apparent. What is even more 
intriguing is that apparently a way has been found to move beyond the annoying 
vagueness of the proponents of the systems approach to a precise and even 
mathematically and statistically formal way of describing complex technology systems. 
In my book, Technology, Development and Democracy, I have characterized this way of 




It is easy to see that the virtue of an economy-wide approach to technology systems is the 
embodiment of various inter-sectoral linkages.   If there are “n” production activities then 
there are mappings connecting each activity with as many production activities and the 
various groups of consumers.   In terms of technology systems, the production activities 
can be broken down into a production (sub-) system and a set of innovative activities, 
including micro subsectors such as the various ICT sectors-cum-technology.  In practice, 
this presents considerable difficulties of classification and empirical estimation.  But 
conceptually the distinction can be made clear. 
  One major component of the entire innovation system is, of course, the 
expenditures on R&D.  R&D expenditures may be specified according to productive 
activities (e.g., construction, electrical equipment, the “digital sectors” etc.) or by 
institutions (e.g., private R&D expenditures, government R&D expenditures, etc.).  It 
should be emphasized that the dynamic effects of R&D on the economy can be captured 
only in a series of such mappings over time. In the following model, the main purpose is 
to establish a multiplicity of equilibria when the innovation system exhibits a non-linear 
relationship between parts of the socio-economic system. Such a relationship may obtain 
simply because of the existence of increasing returns to scale in production. Other types 
of non-linearities may also be present. However, the non-linearities in the production 
relations are the most relevant ones from the perspective of POLIS. Among other things 
this creates the possibility of moving from a technologically stagnant equilibrium to an 
equilibrium that makes a POLIS possible. Within a POLIS such as the ones that exist in 
Japan or the US, further innovation activities and diffusion processers can be studied with 
proper modifications of parameters, functional relations and feedback processes. 
  We begin with a number of productive activities reflecting the existing 
technological structure. We also incorporate the possibility of R&D as a separate 
productive activity. At the level of abstraction we are working, it is always possible to 
                                                 
6 For a more extensive discussion, critique and clarification of a nondeterministc and metaethically non-
relative postmodern context for POLIS, see in particular, chapters 6, 7 and 8 in Khan(1998).   13 
break R&D down into as many finite components as we want. The key relationship in 
this context is that between the endogenous accounts (usually, production activities, 
factors and households) and the exogenous ones.  It is this relationship that is posited to 
be non-linear and this together with some assumptions on the mathematical space can 
lead to the existence of multiple equilibria, as shown below.  We now turn to the formal 
part of the analysis. The analysis is carried out in abstract function spaces.  In the first 
part the relevant space is a vector lattice over a real field R.  In the second part some 
results on ordered Banach space are discussed.  
 
I. The Model on a Lattice 
 Define  X  as a vector lattice over a subring M  of the real field R . 
Let  { } 0 , | ≥ ∈ = + x X x x x  
A non-linear mapping N  is defined such that  0 , : 0 = → + + N X X N .  Given a vector of 
exogenous variables d , the following non-linear mapping describes a simultaneous non-
linear equations model of an economy,  : E  
d Nx x + =            
 (1) 
for a given  + ∈ X d . 
This non-linear system represents a socio-economic system of the type described 
previously.  In order to specify the model further, the following assumptions are 
necessary.  
1.  X  is order complete 
2.  N  is an isotone mapping 
3.    ∈ ∃ x ˆ  such that  d x N x + ≥ ˆ ˆ  
In terms of the economics of the model, the non-linear mapping from the space of inputs 
to the space of the outputs allows for non-constant returns to scale and technical progress 
over time. The 3 assumptions are minimally necessary for the existence of an equilibrium. 
Assumption 3, in particular ensures that there is some level of output vector which can be 
produced given the technical production conditions and demand structure. 
Existence of Multiple Equilibria:  
Theorem: Under the assumptions 1 - 3, there exists  + ∈ X x
*  so that 
* x  is a solution of  
d Nx x + =  
  Proof: Consider the interval [] { } x x X x x x ≤ ≤ ∈ = + ˆ 0 , ˆ | ˆ , 0 w h e r e   x ˆ   is defined as in 
assumption 3.  Take a mapping F . 
d Nx X x F + → ∈ + : 
F  is isotone and maps [] x , 0  into itself. 
Define a set  [] {} Fx x x x x D ≥ ∈ ≡ , , 0.  
By assumption 3, D is non-empty. 
We now show  D x inf
* ≡   is a solution to  d Nx x + = .  D x inf
* ≡ ; therefore 
D x x x ∈ ∀ ≤ ,
* . F  is isotone; therefore  x Fx Fx ≤ ≤
*  for each  D x∈  implying. 
 
* * x Fx ≤  
From (2) we have  ()
* * Fx Fx F ≤ . Thus  D Fx ∈
* ; hence 
* * inf Fx D x ≤ ≡  so, 
* * * Fx x Fx ≤ ≤ . Therefore 
* * Fx x = . 
   14 
This is an application of Tarski’s and Birkhoff’s theorem.  The key feature to note here is 
that the equilibrium is not necessarily unique.  It should also be noted that under 
additional assumptions on space  X  and the mapping N  the computation of a fixed point 
can be done by standard methods (e.g. Ortega and Rheinboldt). 
 
II. Multiple Equilibria on Banach Space:   
  In this section the results for multiple equilibria are extended to functionals on 
Banach Space. We can define the model again for monotone iterations, this time on a 
non-empty subset of an ordered Banach space  X . The mapping  X X f → :  is called 
compact if it is continuous and if  () x f  is relatively compact.  The map  f  is called 
completely continuous if f   is continuous and maps bounded subsets of X  into 
compact sets.  Let  X  be a non-empty subset of some ordered set Y .  A fixed point x 
of a map  X X N → : is called minimal (maximal) if every fixed point y  of N  in  X  
satisfies 
  () x y y x ≤ ≤  
Theorem: Let () P E, be an ordered Banach space and let D be a subset of E .   
Suppose that  E D f → :  is an increasing map which is compact on every order interval 
in D. If there exist  , y   D y∈ ˆ with  y y ˆ ≤  such that  () y f y ≤ and  () y y f ˆ ˆ ≤ , then  f  has 
a minimal fixed point x.  Moreover,  y x ≤  and  () y F x
k lim = . That is, the minimal fixed 
point can be computed iteratively by means of the iteration scheme 
  y x = 0  
  () k k x f x = + 1    ,.... 2 , 1 , 0 = k  
Moreover, the sequence () k x  is increasing. 
Proof: Since  f  is increasing, the hypotheses imply that  f  maps the order interval [] y y, 
into itself.  Consequently, the sequence () k x  is well-defined and, since it is contained in 
[] y y f , , it is relatively compact.  Hence it has at least one limit point.  By induction, it is 
easily seen that the sequence () k x  is increasing.  This implies that it has exactly one limit 
point x  and that the whole sequence converges to x . Since ƒ  is continuous, x  is a fixed 
point of  f .  If x is an arbitrary fixed point in D such that  y x ≥ , then, by replacing y  
by  x in the above argument, it follows that  x x ≤ . Hence x  is the minimal fixed point 
of  f  in () D P y ∩ + .  It should be observed that we do not claim that there exists a 
minimal fixed point of  f  in D. 
We can also show that if  d Nx X x F + → ∈ + :  is an intersecting compact map in 
a non-empty order interval [] x x ˆ ,  and  Fx x ≤  and  x x F ˆ ˆ ≤  then  F  has a minimal fixed 
point 
* x  and a maximal fixed point 
* * x .  Moreover,  () x F x
k lim
* =  and  () x F x
k ˆ lim
* * = . 
The first of the above sequences is increasing and the second is decreasing. 
The above results are applications and extensions of fixed point theorems for 
increasing maps on abstract spaces due to Herbert Amann (1976). It is intriguing that 
they find such natural applications in economics with evolving technology systems and 
non-constant returns to scale. Although those theorems provide some structure for the 
equilibria in the socio-economic structure with evolving technology systems, it is not 
   15 
specified a priori which equilibrium will be reached. The problem of equilibrium 
selection thus remains open. The idea behind POLIS can now be stated more formally. It 
is to reach a sequence of equilibria so that the maximal fixed points that are attainable are 
in fact reached through a combination of market forces and policy maneuvers over time. 
It is also to be  understood that path-dependence of technology would  rule out certain 
equilibria in the future. Thus initial choices of technologies can matter crucially at 
times.This highlights the need for choosing the appropriate types of ICTs and creating 
complementary human and knowledge capital right from the beginning. In case of a 
technology subsystem such as the  ICT subsystem, the catch up process is thus a complex 
one. In case of particular technologies such as the WDM technology discussed in the 
paper, the particular technological features, initial market conditions, and particular 
policies all have their different roles to play. Finally, the welfare implications of growth 
and diffusion of IT can be evaluated within these multisectoral, economywide models by 






I now move towards an historical and institutional  description of the key results which 
illustrate the applicability of the formal model empirically  for the  ICT sectors  for a 
specific Asian NIE. 
 
ICT Sectors in a POLIS and Policymaking in Developing Economies: What Have 
We learned? --- A Case Study Of an NIE 
 
The empirical work done so far on the ICT sectors in the NIEs and some other 
developing economies reveals the presence and importance of increasing returns to scale, 
economies of scope, network externalities and strategic complementarity between R&D 
and human resource development. This line of work also reveals the problems of building 
a POLIS when many of its ingredients are either missing or are underdeveloped.The 
example of South Korea is illustrative and instructive. 
 
Whatever the record in the 1960s and 1970s, by the 1980s Korea did enter a largely 
modern technology-centered era (Khan, 1997a).  Therefore, we need to investigate the 
situation during the last decade and a half in order to see the source and role of this 
modern technology system.  First, it is necessary to look at the transfer of technology 
from abroad to Korea.  In the process we also will have an opportunity to examine 
Teitel's characterization of the three phases of technological development.  According to 
Teitel (1984 a, b) the first phase is the acquisition of technology from abroad; the second 
phase involves the modification of borrowed technology.  The final phase is the 
generation of technology at home.  This acquisition-modification-creation process can be 
observed in the history of economic evolution of the advanced industrial countries. 
  The government of Korea passed the Technology Development Promotion Act 
(TDPA) in 1972 the purpose of which was to facilitate technology imports.  This coincided 
with the establishment of Technology Imports Counseling Center at the Korea Institute of   16 
Science and Technology.  At the same time the Korea Development Bank's ‘technology 
development fund’ originated as a source of financing.  The following year the TDPA was 
further liberalized to relax the approval criteria for imported technologies. 
  The third and fourth five-year economic development plans emphasized the role of 
heavy and chemical industries.  A form of industrial policy can be seen to be at work here.  
Table 2 summarizes the changes in Technology import policy since 1978.  The financial 
assistance facilities also played important roles. These are presented in table 3. Table 4  
shows the declared industrialization and technology strategies during the decade of 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s.  It is important to note that promotion of high-tech industries became a 
goal only in the 1980s.    17 
  
  
Table2: Changes in Technology Import Policy during the decade of creating the modern 
technology system since 1978 (1978- 1988) 
Period Contents  Industry 
First Step 
(April 1978) 
- Automatic approval items: 
•  advance payment less than $30,000, 
royalty rates less than 3%,license period 
less than 3 years 
•  Total royalty less than $100,000 
Machinery, shipbuilding, 
electrical goods, electronics, 




- Automatic approval items: 
•  Advance payment less than $50,000, 
royalty rate less than 10%, license 
period less than 10 years 
All industries, except nuclear 
energy and defense industry. 
Third Step 
(July 1980) 
- Automatic approval items: 
royalty rate less 10%, license period less 














- Transfer of trademarks only permitted  All industries. 
Seventh Step 
(July 1988) 
- Delegation of approval authority to Class 
A foreign exchange banks under the 
Foreign Exchange Control Act, except in 
cases where the license period exceeds 3 
years and the total royalty exceeds 
$100,000 or the royalty rate exceeds 2% (or 
initial payment exceeds $50,000) 
All industries. 
 
Source: Korea Industrial Technology Association, Surveys on Technology Imports, 1992, p.9. 
 
 
As Table 2 shows, changes in technology import policy since 1978 have become more 
liberal.  The openness that existed with respect to trade in consumer goods can be said to 
have been extended to capital goods with embodied technology. Table 3 shows the general 
structure of the financial assistance system. Clearly, without such financing, technology 
imports would be hampered. These policies are consistent with the general development 




Table 3: Financial Assistance System  during the period of creating a high technology 
system 
Government Subsidy  Direct subsidy to private firms or industrial technology research 
association who participate in special R&D project or industrial 
basic technology development project for 40-80% of R&D fund. 
Loan by Policy Fund  Annual 5.0-10.5% interest rate loan on R&D and 
commercialization of new technology. 
General Loan  Loan assistance to R&D and commercialization of new technology 
by Korea Development Bank, Small-Medium Firm Bank, and 
other banks.  The same interest rates as bank loans. 
Assistance to Venture 
Capital 
Korea General Technology Fund (Inc.) 
Technology Credit 
Guarantee 
Technology Credit Guarantee Fund 
 




Table 4: Development strategies by stages of development for three decades leading to the 
creation of the high technology system 
Period     Direction of Industrialization  Technological development strategy 
1960s  1.  Establishment of the foundation for 
industrialization. 
2. Fostering  of  import-substitution 
industries. 
3.  Expansion of export-oriented light 
industries (mainly labor-intensive 
industries). 
1.   Expanding education in science and 
technology and training in skills. 
2.   Establishment of the legal and 
institutional basis for the promotion of 
science and technology. 
3.   Facilitating the importation of advanced 
technologies. 
1970s  4.  Enhancing the sophistication of 
industries and fostering the heavy and 
chemical industries. 
5.  Promotion of small- and medium- 
sized industries. 
6.  Strengthening the competitiveness of 
industries in the international market. 
1.  Upgrading technological and scientific 
training in priority areas. 
2.  Facilitating the adaptation and 
improvement of imported technologies 
through the establishment of research 
entities in private industries. 
3. Strengthening  industrial  technology 
research and development capability. 
1980s  7.  Enhancing the quality of export 
goods. 
8.  Promotion of skill-intensive industries 
(high-tech industries). 
9.  Fostering of information industry 
1.   Providing the large-scale recruitment 
from abroad and training of highly 
qualified scientific and technological 
manpower. 
2.   Liberalization of technology imports. 
3.   Preparation for an information-oriented 
society. 
Source: Excerpted from Khan (1997a). 
  It is interesting to note that as the Korean economy has grown it has progressively 
imported more technology.  More than 75 per cent of all foreign technologies imported 
between 1962 and 1991 came from Japan and the U.S.  Table 5 shows TI (technology 
imports), FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) and capital goods imports by Korea.  The growth 
in imported technology and capital goods is noticeable throughout the 1980s.   20 
 
 
Table 5: TI, FDI, and Capital Goods Imports: 1962-91( upto the creation of high technology 
system) 





FDI••••       FDI••••       A/B 









62-66     0.8    33    47.4      39      1.7     486.0  18.9 
67-71    20.4   285   218.6     350      9.3    2668.0  30.8 
72-76    96.5   434   879.4     851     11.0    8106.0  27.3 
   77    58.1   168    83.6      54     69.5    3008.1  27.8 
   78    85.1   297   149.4      51     57.0    5080.3  33.9 
   79    93.9   291   191.3      55     49.1    6314.0  31.0 
   80   107.2   222   143.1      40     74.9    5125.0  23.0 
   81   107.1   247   153.1      44     70.0    6158.2  23.6 
   82   115.7   308   189.0      56     61.2    6232.7  25.7 
   83   149.5   362   269.4      75     55.5    7814.7  29.8 
   84   213.2   437   422.3     104     50.5   10106.3  33.0 
   85   295.5   454   532.1     127     55.4   11078.9  35.6 
   86   411.0   517   354.7     203    115.9   11340.2  35.9 
   87   523.7   637  1063.3     362     49.3   14552.4  35.5 
   88   676.3   751  1282.7     342     52.7   19033.4  36.7 
   89   888.6   763  1090.2     336     81.5   22370.3  36.4 
   90  1087.0   738   802.5     296    135.5   25451.3  36.4 













ratio (%)  (3.1)    (4.8)  (100)   
•  approval basis. 
Sources: Korea Industrial Technology Association, Major Indicators of Industrial 
Technology, 1992; Ministry of Finance, The Status of Foreign Direct Investment, Dec. 
1991; The Korean Statistical Association, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1992. 
 
  The adoption and diffusion of technology (imported or otherwise acquired), 
inevitably requires various lengths of time. On the demand side, the profitability of imported 
technology must be a  major factor.  However direct measures are impossible to get. A 
proxy that follows the strategy of Khan (1997a) is obtained by considering the profitability 
of the large and medium sized enterprises which are assumed to use imported technology.  
Adaptabilities of technologies also matter. The extent to which imported technologies can be 
adapted to domestic needs and circumstances also depends mainly on the technological 
capabilities of the host firms.  Here, too, the large- and medium- sized enterprises will 
generally have a better chance of adapting the foreign technology. 
  It is possible to collect the relevant information and to organize this information in 
an economy wide technology systems matrix ( technically called SAM-TECH) format.     21 
Looking at the information organized as a SAM-TECH as well as closely within its 
components results in the following observations: 
  1. With the exception of heavy industries, large and medium firms import relatively 
new technologies.  This is consistent with Khan’s (1997a) finding that the 
production functions in different firm sizes within the same industry differ. 
  2. Large size firms also seem to have greater bargaining power.  They have shorter 
waiting periods for adoption of foreign technology. 
  3. Industries with competitive structures import technology at a slower rate than 
those which are oligopolistic. 
  4. In its acquisition, the price of new technology seems less of a determinant than the 
perceived needs of the firm.  In other words demand for technology imports has 
been inelastic in many cases. 
  
  Given the prevalence of foreign technology in a number of sectors, one should 
expect more productivity increase in these sectors than in the other sectors with less than 
state-of-the-art technology.  On the whole, this does turn out to be the case. The average for 
the foreign technology-intensive sectors turns out to be 2.8 per cent TFP growth annually 
from 1980 to 1994. 
  If imported technology were the only source of technology for the modern 
technology system, then the question of whether Korea has a POLIS could be settled 
immediately.  The short answer would be that indeed it has no POLIS.  However, the 
policies of the Korean government and the efforts of large Korean firms to create an   
innovation system cannot be passed over in silence.  In the next section, the Korean 
innovation system is examined. 
 
Learning to Innovate: Efforts to Build A Korean POLIS 
Larry Westphal, Howard Pack, Sherman Robinson and Hollis Chenery, among others, have 
emphasized the role of industrial policy in an export-led economy like South Korea.   
According to Westphal (1990): 
  Korea provides an illuminating case of state intervention to promote 
economic development.  Like many other third world governments, Korea's 
government has selectively intervened to affect the allocation of resources 
among industrial activities.  It has also used similar policies: taxes and 
subsidies, credit rationing, various kinds of licensing, and the creation of 
public enterprises...but these policies have been applied in the context of a 
radically different development strategy, one of export-led industrialization.
7 
 
  If one follows a Schumpeterian approach to technology creation as a cascade of 
interlinked systemic activities, the possibilities for economies of scale and scope leading to 
                                                 
7 Larry Westphal (1990), 'Industrial Policy in an Export-Propelled Economy: Lessons from 
South Korea's Experience', The Journal of Economic Perspectives (summer), 41. See 
also, Khan (1985,1997) and Kim (1989, 1997). 
 
   22 
the establishment of a POLIS arise out of the conjunction of a market system open to the 
world economy and selective interventions.  Promotion of targeted infant industries has been 
part of this strategy of selective interventions in Korea.  Examples include cement, fertilizer 
and petroleum refining in the 1960s.  These were followed by steel and petrochemicals.  In 
the late 1970s, shipbuilding, other chemicals, capital goods and durable consumer goods 
appeared on the list.  More recently, electronic and information technologies are being 
promoted.  Do these industries innovate?  Even if they individually do innovate, do the 
industrial, governmental and social institutions connected to the innovation process add up 
to an innovation system?  Furthermore is the innovation system, if it exists, characterized by 
positive feedbacks? 
  One quantitative indicator of the possibility of an innovation system would be the 
trend in R&D.  Table 6 shows the major R&D indicators in Korea. Between 1965 and 1990 
the expenditures increased more than 500 times.  However the major take off has really been 
since the mid-1980s.  Noticeable also is the reversal of the roles of public and private sectors.  
In 1990 the private sector provided 84 per cent of R&D funds.   23 
Table 6: Major R&D Indicators in Korea during the key phases of creating the modern and 
ultimately the high technology system 1965-1990 
                                                         1965              1975             1980              1985              1990 
R&D expenditure ($ Million)                 8                 88                321              1298             4481 
  Funds from government (A)             7.2                  59                186                247               717 
  Funds from private sources (B)        0.8                  29                135               1051            3764 
  A:B                                               90:10            67:33              52:48             19:81            16:84 
  R&D/Manufacturing sales (%)         n.a.              0.35               0.65                1.51              2.07 
GNP ($Million)                                2759           20,952           55,345            87,703       234,607 
  R&D/GNP (%)                               0.29               0.42               0.58                1.48              1.91 
R&D researchers (persons )             2765           10,275           18,434            41,473          70,503 
  Research institutes                            n.a.              5308              4598               7154          10,434 
  Universities                                       n.a.              2312              8695            14,935          21,332 
  Companies                                        n.a.              2655              5141            18,996          38,737 
R&D researchers per 10,000 pop.      1.0                 2.9                 4.8                 10.1             16.4 
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology, Report on the Survey of Research and 
Development in Science and Technology, various issues; 
  The number of research personnel is also an important indicator of the possibilities 
of a POLIS.  In the case of Korea, the number of core scientists increased by more than 30 
times between 1965 and 1990.  Here again, companies and universities are now the first and 
second largest employers of researchers, respectively. 
  Another important indicator of an innovation system is the number of patents.  In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s the number of Korean patents grew, on the average, at a rate of 
17.1 per cent (see table 7).  In absolute terms, however, Korea seems to be still far behind 
the advanced industrial nations. 
 
Table 7: Trends of Industrial Property Rights Applied by Korean and Foreign Nationals 
during the crucial phase of creating a POLIS 
         ( U n i t :   c a s e ,   % )  




Industrial         
Designs 
Trade Marks 
  12,759 
  22,401 
  18,731 
   
  28,031 
  23,315 
  21,530 
  18,196 
   
  39,832 
  25,820 
  22,654 
  18,769 
   
  46,826 
  28,132 
  25,895 
  20,097 
 
  46,612 
     17.1 
      2.9 
      1.4 
    
     10.7 
     TOTAL    81,922   102,873   114,069   120,736        8.1 
Korean Nat’ls 
Foreign Nat’ls 
  63,256 
  18,666 
  68,300 
  27,271 
  81,713 
  32,356 
  90,659 
  30,077 
      7.5 
     10.0 
 
Source: The Office of Patents Administration, Patents Annals, various issues. 
 
  One special feature of the Korean industrial system in general and its innovation 
system in particular, is the role played by its chaebols, the big business conglomerates in 
developing and improving industrial technologies. With a large endowment of capital and   24 
modern complex organizational structure the chaebol can recruit the best human resources, 
identify and purchase the best foreign technology and obtain preferential financing.  They 
have also established R&D and technical training facilities recognizing the importance of in-
house R&D capability. 
  The government established the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) in the 
1960s.  It also has initiated a long-term science and technology development plan.  Most 
government ministries and bureaucratic strata have been involved in one way or another in 
formulating and implementing the science and technology policies.  The government has 
also pursued a scientific and technical human resources management policy. 
  In the late 1960s, Kwahakwha Undong or the Science Movement was supported by 
MOST.  The creation of a university system has certainly led to an increase in the stock and 
flow of human capital.  However, Korea still has a long way to go before it can claim to 
have created a world class research university system. 
  At the microeconomic level R&D capacity building by a firm can be illustrated by 
discussing the example of Samsung Electronics Company (SEC).  SEC is Korea's largest 
integrated electronics company.  Table 8 shows the diverse product lines of SEC.   25 
 
 
Table 8: Major Product Line-up of SEC during the creation of the Korean POLIS 
 
      Business Sector                   Product Line 
Audio  and  Video  Business  TV, LCD Projector, VCR, Camcorder, Component 
Audio, CDP, MD, DCC, LDP, MOD, CD-I, CD-ROM 
Consumer  Electronics  Business  Refrigerator, Microwave Oven, Air Conditioner, 
Washing Machine, Vacuum Cleaner 
Computer  System  Business  Mini Computer, Micro Computer, Desk-Top PC, Lap-
Top/Note PC, Pen Base PC, Palm-Top PC, Network 
System, Work Station, Optical Filing System, 
Teleconference System, CTS, BAS 
Telecommunication  System  Business  TDX, Modem, MUX, PAD, Facsimile, Typewriter, 
Copier, Key Phone, Pager, Car Phone, Hand-held Phone, 
Optical Communication System, Optical Fiber 
Memory  Devices  Business  DRAM, SRAM, EEPROM, MASK ROM, Specialty 
Memory, TPH, TFT, LCD, CIS 
Micro  Devices  Business  Discrete, MOSIC, Linear IC, ASIC, Logic IC, Micro 
Component, DSP 
Source: Public Relations Office, Samsung Electronics, Creativity and Innovation (1993), p. 
47. 
 
  In the semi-conductor field, Samsung developed 64K DRAMs in 1983.  In 1990 it 
shared in the making of 16M DRAM.  SEC also exports an electronic switching system 
(Time Division Exchange or TDX) to other LDCs.  It also manufactures digital, cellular and 
satellite transmission systems.  It is also active in fiber-optic communication systems.  SEC 
offers a full line of products in the micro-computer field.  Perhaps better known among 
consumers is the line of consumer electronics products of SEC ranging from TV to 
microwave ovens. 
  SEC has a three tiered R&D system shown in table 9. Samsung Advanced Institute 
of Technology (SAIT) carries out research into basic or core technologies.  Application 
technology and mid-term projects are the responsibility of the research centers associated 
with SEC's four business sectors.  Finally, on the production technology side research teams 
attached to each division unit work closely with production and marketing people to make 
new or improved products.   26 
 
 
Table 9: SEC’s Three-tiered R&D System 
 
  Samsung Electronic Company  Samsung Advanced 
 Institute of technology 
 Integrated  Research 
Centers 
Research Team and 
Design Office attached 










Cooperation with SAIT 
Maximization of 
company’s profit 
Establishment of technological 
foundation for the growth of 
the Group 
 






commercialization on a  
short- and mid-term 
basis 
Commercialization of 




models, improvement of 
functions and cost 
reduction of existing 
products 
Development of new products 
on a mid- and long-term basis 
 
Development of core 
technologies, bottle-neck 
technologies, and new 
materials and parts 
Source: Twenty Years History of SEC, 837. 
 
  The discussion so far shows the strengths and limitations of both the standard macro 
and micro approaches in addressing the question posed at the beginning of this paper. At the 
macro level, statistical results may overstate or understate the overall innovative capability.  
At the same time the results on the whole warn against a casual optimism regarding East 
Asian growth in general and Korea in particular.  The micro considerations show that in 
contrast to macro-pessimism some companies such as SEC do have considerable innovative 
capabilities.
8  However, it is not obvious if the SEC experience is generalizable for Korea as 
a whole or even a few sectors. Thus, there is a great gap at the current stage of research on 
ICT. Many more sectoral and firm level studies are necessary before firm conclusions could 
be drawn. 
 
In terms of ICT development, ownership of personal computers and  the number of internet 
hosts as well as telecommunications facilities increased several folds between 1993 and 
1998(Tschang 2000). For example, in1998, Korea had a total of 7,252,000 personal 
computers, or on the average 157 PCs per thousand people. This put S. Korea ahead of most 
Asian economies except for Japan and Singapore. Korea also had 4,015 internet hosts per 
                                                 
8  In this connection Kim (1997) documents for several industries as well as for the e3conomy as a whole, 
the growth in technological capabilities of Korea.   27 
million people, much further along the way of building a digital economy than the rest of 
developing Asia. 
 
At the microeconomic, firm level the emergence of the so-called “venture companies” in the 
ICT sectors could challenge the hegemony of the chaebols.According to the Korea Venture 
Business Association, there will be about 40,000 such companies by 2005. The Ministry of 
Information and Communications reported 252 info-tech start up firms for 1999 with a total 
revenue of 4.9 trillion won. The overall size of the internet economy is estimated as 8 trillion 
won or two per cent of GDP. 
 
The chaebols are experiencing some  migration of human resource to some of these start up 
companies. In response, leading chaebols such as the Lucky Goldstar (LG)and Samsung 
have initiated strategic moves. These range from incentive pay via stock options etc. to 
acquiring stakes in ICT companies. In 1999, LG acquired a majority stake in Dacom, a 
leading ISP and the second largest telecommunications company. SEC has established a 
strategic alliance with Yahoo! Inc. It has also created a special team in order to identify 
promising entrepreneurs and to assist them in bringing their products to the market. 
Samsung now has an Internet Shopping Division. More generally, as a business strategy, the 
chaebols are establishing incubators to compete with the upstart newcomers. In the year 
2000, Samsung had 9 incubators with US$ 17.6 million in start up funds. 
 
However, graduating out of the ranks of developing countries and joining the OECD 
involved rapid liberalization of the Korean economy. According to some observers (e.g., 
Chang 1998; Khan forthcoming,2004) this type of financial  liberalization in particular was 
directly responsible for Korea’s being caught in the Asian financial crisis. Even if one 
disagrees with the exact causes, there is no doubt that the massive deflation and corporate 




Another relevant development for Korea in the international dimension was its signing the 
WTO agreements. This led to trade liberalization that made technological imports and 
exports more free and therefore, theoretically, would have resulted in net welfare gain. 
However, the cases brought against Korea through the dispute settlement mechanism and 
other bilateral actions, combined with the impacts of the financial crisis, seem to have 
diminished that hope in the short run. 
 
In the long run, the provisions of TRIPs are the most important for the ICT sectors.
10 The 
TRIPs agreement with its seven parts and. seventy three articles is the most important 
international attempt to harmonize intellectual property rights(IPRs) globally. The   
coverage is intended to be comprehensive and contains, for example, integrated circuits 
designs, biotechnology and software protection in addition to the standard copyright, 
trademarks, patents and other related areas. here are enforcement provisions requiring 
                                                 
9 Consideration of such issues highlight the strengths and limits of the official international views of 
Korea’s transition to knowledge-based economy. See for example Dahlman and Andersson (2000) study 
for OECD/ World Bank. 
10 See Maskus (2000), Lai (1997) and Khan (2001c)   28 
civil and criminal measures and border enforcements that are likely to be costly for 
countries like Korea with ambition to build a POLIS through ICT sectors innovations. 
Institutionally, Korea’s entry into the WTO in 1994  also meant agreeing to be monitored 
and reviewed by the TRIPs council and accepting the TRIPs dispute settlement 
mechanisms.The long run impacts of adhering to all these provisions on Korean digital 
economy are not clear. In the short run, importing technology would have been easier; 
but since the Asian crisis many firms have suffered from foreign exchange shortage. At 
the same time, the foreign currency payments of licensing fee and other IPRs-related 






The ICT revolution has given rise to much utopian technological thinking. For example, 
in the context of the so-called ‘wild computing’ three phases of development of the 
internet itself  are posited although the world is only at the threshold of the first of them. 
In this first phase, computer and communications technologies serve to enhance human 
interactions. A first metasystem transition is expected to lead to the second phase, in 
which the totality of computer and communication systems will have evolved so as to 
constitute a coherent mind or a set of coherent minds in the digital environment. As 
though this were not enough, a further transition is imagined leading to a third phase in 
which superhuman AI programs rewrite their own code so as to develop their own 
intelligence and the whole complex system takes off with unpredictable results. Many 
aspects of this phase are very uncertain, including the part that humans may play, but 
there are suggestions that human brains might be linked into the net, either by some sort 
of coupling into intact brains or by human intelligences choosing to abandon their 
physical bodies and uploading themselves into the digital environment. Developments of 
the kind have been portrayed in science fiction, which may turn out to be prophetic. Or, 




Even at the first stage of transition the digital age has brought new opportunities for the 
developing economies by presenting some of them with the prospects for leapfrogging.
11 
                                                 
11 It should be pointed out that the concept of leapfrogging is used in at least three different ways in the 
literature. In the narrowest sense, it can refer to the ICT sectors only, and the prospects for quickly catching 
up with the technological frontier , or at least skipping over part of the product cycle. A second way of 
defining the concept of leapfrogging is to think of the ICT sectors as ‘engines of growth’. At the broadest 
level, the concept of leapfrogging can entail the idea that the ICT revolution can enable the developing 
societies to rapidly proceed to a postindustrial society with knowledge-based economies. Careful case by 
case analysis is necessary to see which kind of leapfrogging, if any, may be possible for a particular 
developing country. A nuanced analysis of the economy, state and the civil society is a sine qua non. 
POLIS theory can be seen as a first step towards such a wide system level analysis. For a wide-ranging   29 
By investing strategically in physical, intellectual and other forms of human and 
organizational capital these economies may be able to forge a path not only in the ICT 
sectors, but also create postmodern innovation systems of their own. Under the emerging 
globally competitive market environment this will be the best way to compete 
dynamically. However, creating comparative advantage in this way requires capabilities 
that many developing countries lack at the moment. Without a mix of openness and 
strong  governance, it is unlikely that even a start can be made. 
 
The case study of Korea presented in this paper is instructive in several ways from this 
perspective. A strong state under Park Chung-hee, Korea was able to go through several 
stages of modernization during the 70s and 80s. It created a solid infrastructure and 
started to  generate knowledge-based production and services in the 90s. However, the 
mix of domestic policy mistakes and exogenous developments in the second half of the 
decade resulted in the most serious crisis in the Korean economy since the second world 
war. The economy is yet to recover from the damage done to its capacity to develop 
dynamic innovative capability.
12 Yet from  a longer term strategic perspective prescribing 
moves for the creation of a postmodern POLIS  in the region may be crucial for Korea 
and the other Asian NIEs. 
 
Many developing countries including the Asian NIEs seem committed to the path of ICT 
development. What seem to be lacking are the awareness of some of the pitfalls and the 
need for both economic resources and institution building. Strategically, developing   
world class education and training facilities on a regional basis and sharing the burden of 
ICT sectors development through various regional cooperation schemes may be the best 
alternative. Therefore, the time may have come to discuss seriously and practically how 
to develop POLIS and ICT, not for individual national economies, but for entire 
developing regions in a supranational manner.
13  
 
It needs to be recognized that the scope of POLIS is wider than economic or even 
political economic analysis. Complex adaptive systems have many interconnected parts, 
each with its own complex domain. The POLIS theory encourages, indeed invites, a 
systemic analysis of such complexities. Future work needs to be directed towards 
analyzing not only the relationship between the state and the economy, but also the 
intimate and complex relations among the civil society, the state  and the economy.
14In 
                                                                                                                                                 
discussion of the difficulties of leapfrogging in telecommunications with  an in-depth case study of 
telecommunications sector restructuring in India see Singh(1999). 
12  In this connection the observations made by Chang (2001) in Pulling Up the Ladder are particularly 
germane. The current neoliberal international environment may make such ‘technological recovery’ and 
restart most difficult, if not impossible. This is another reason for considering regional cooperation and 
institution building seriously. 
13 For lack of space it is not possible here to develop the normative implications of a regional POLIS for 
well-being and freedom. I have attempted a partial critical analysis based on an extension of Amartya Sen’s 
capabilities approach in Khan(1998) by  developing the idea of paradoxes for freedom in a modernist 
innovation system, and applying it to a POLIS for Taiwan. Beck’s concept of reflexivity is also analyzed 
critically in Khan(1998) and it is shown that under postmodern conditions we have really at best a 
‘refractive’ reflexivity. 
14 As an example of this see chapter six of Khan (1998) where the concept of ‘deep democracy’ is used to 
unify these intrasystemic or subsystemic concepts at the overall systemic level.   30 
this context the current developments in political science and international relations in 
expanding the concept of power can help a great deal. In particular, the idea of meta-
power which emphasizes the constitution of identities, interests and institutions at the 
national, regional and global level is highly relevant.
15 Together with the development of 
the idea of regional civil societies in Asia and elsewhere that are not parochial and open 
to the outside, the states-system in Asia can embark on the project of strengthening the 
existing modes of cooperation and building new, strategically-oriented institutions of 
regional cooperation. 
 
Finally, it should be emphasized that the theoretical approach developed here also allows 
to evaluate the state of the economy and society ethically by extending and incorporating 
Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach within the POLIS. A beginning has been made by 
extending the idea of capabilities to a setting of interacting social network of institutions 
and thus develop the idea of ‘social’capabilities in Khan(1998;2003). Lack of space does 
not permit further extensions here, but the normative analysis of well-being in a POLIS is 
just as important as the positive analysis of the possibilities for building a POLIS. 
 
                                                 
15 Particularly with respect to the information technologies, see the chapters under the heading, ‘changing 
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